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[B]Introduction 
Whilst we know from Shakespeare that the course of true love never did run smooth,
1
 
the path to resolving disputes on relationship breakdown was always going to be 
bumpier. Yet it is cohabitation law reform in England and Wales, particularly in 
dealing with the financial consequences of couple separation, which is proving to be 
the rockiest ride of all. To date, both the Law Commission report recommending 
reform
2
 and Lord Lester’s Cohabitation Bill 20093 have fallen on deaf legislative 
ears.
4
 This is despite what is now a wealth of research advocating the need for reform 
and evidence of strong public support for it, particularly where there are children.
5
 
Neither is there anything in the first Queen’s Speech of the new coalition government 
that indicates that this is likely to change in a hurry, notwithstanding a promised 
review of Family Law. Whilst the reinstatement of greater tax relief for married 
couples reveals a clear preference by the new government for retaining the status quo 
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of legal privilege within family policy, we have also been told that they believe that 
‘strong and stable families of all kinds are the bedrock of a strong and stable society’.6 
Thus the direction family policy is now to take may not be clear. However, one 
discernible tension within family law regulation that it will undoubtedly face is that 
between providing couples, whether married or not, with more autonomy to negotiate 
and agree on the legal consequences of their relationship – a contractual model; and 
the role family law has traditionally played in the protection of the economically 
weaker or more financially ‘vulnerable’7 family members – perhaps better expressed 
as the prevention of exploitation.  
Whatever belief the new government may have in using law as an important way of 
both sending out symbolic messages and influencing behaviour,
8
 we would caution 
that a purely pro-marriage government policy is unlikely to be able to reverse the 
family restructuring trends away from marriage into other couple relationships. 
Research shows that these trends are not unique to Britain and are evident throughout 
the Western world, irrespective, largely, of the family law regime in place.
9
 If pro-
marriage regulation were the way to prevent large-scale cohabitation, then Ireland 
with restrictive divorce laws and no legal acknowledgment to date of cohabitation 
relationships would not, over one decade, have experienced the four-fold increase in 
unmarried heterosexual cohabitation that its census statistics reveal.
10
 Conversely, 
states which have given increased rights to cohabiting couples have not seen any 
greater increase in family structuring away from marriage and into unmarried 
cohabitation than that which existed prior to this.
11
  
Thus if cohabitation is not going to go away and indeed is likely to continue to 
increase,
12
 it is very probable that at some point in the future, policy makers will 
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return to the question of whether a family law which is centred on formal marriage 
(and now formal same-sex civil partnerships) is fit for purpose, when social norms 
and trends in England and Wales are accepting and reflecting a far more diverse range 
of family relationships. 
It is suggested here that, at that moment, it will be important when deciding on 
appropriate modes of regulation to clarify what role we are expecting family law to 
play in interventions in family life. We must also consider what we know about the 
emotional and psychological expectations of those experiencing couple relationships 
such as marriage and cohabitation in the twenty-first century. Relationship choice is 
now legitimately regarded as a personal matter, with a right to respect for private and 
family life guaranteed.
13
 So the factors perceived as appropriate in relation to the 
law’s role in aiding or impeding solutions in couple regulation reinforce the 
credibility and effectiveness of law in this field. 
In order to assist such a reflective approach, this article will draw on two studies of 
cohabiting couples’ attitudes and behaviours in England and Wales and assess the 
suitability of the quite different proposals for reform of cohabitation law put forward 
by the Law Commission in 2007 and the Cohabitation Bill 2009 in the light of what 
we know of cohabitants’ practices. It will also consider whether there is a role for law 
to intervene in informal couple relationships to protect the most vulnerable family 
members or whether the limit of the role of the law is simply to give greater 
recognition to autonomy and private ordering. We will also consider whether there are 
stumbling blocks to private ordering which emerge from understandings of couple 
behaviour, which often contrast with the legal understandings and expectations of 
‘legally rational behaviour’. By considering how well the recent proposals for reform 
would fit with what we know about family practices, the article will go on to question 
whether autonomy, as a concept used to express empowerment within relationships, is 
appropriate or attainable or whether its role needs to be reconsidered in the light of 
expected social, family and behavioural norms. 
[B]Background to the studies 
Our data come from two linked interdisciplinary studies of cohabitants and former 
cohabitants, separately funded by the Nuffield Foundation and the Ministry of Justice 
(MoJ) (formerly the Department for Constitutional Affairs) and undertaken between 
2006 and 2009.
14
 Aspects of both projects aimed to explore the inhibitors to different-
sex cohabiting couples taking legal steps to ‘put their affairs in order’ and also to 
examine the effect of the government-funded Living Together Campaign
15
 and 
surrounding media coverage, which intensified around the period the Law 
Commission published their consultation paper
16
 in May 2006. Incorporating a socio-
legal/psychological dimension, both projects were looking to build on earlier 
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research.
17
 This work had first revealed, a widespread ‘common law marriage myth’ 
whereby the majority of people in general, and of cohabitants in particular, falsely 
believe that over time, cohabiting couples acquire the same legal rights as married 
couples. A second important finding had been that, nationally, very few cohabitants 
(under 10%) sought legal advice or took legal action as a result of cohabitation unless 
and until the relationship broke down, a figure which did not significantly increase 
amongst ‘legally aware’ cohabitants, often despite good intentions to take action. 
Reasons for this included an optimistic assumption that they (unlike others) would not 
need such legal steps as well as the cost and complexity of the steps needed to follow 
legal advice.
18
 The Living Together Campaign (LTC), which was launched in 2004, 
was part of the government response to this research. Its website provides clear advice 
about the different legal positions of married and cohabiting couples in different 
contexts and guidance on what could and could not be done to gain legal protection 
similar to that automatically acquired by law through marriage. Downloadable 
documents were available for those cohabitants accessing the site to take legal steps 
such as make wills, draw up living together agreements or next of kin statements. The 
MoJ project therefore set out to assess the impact of the Campaign, by then in its third 
year, on those cohabitants accessing the LTC website who were ‘legally aware’ of 
how the law treated them. First an internet survey, accessed from the LTC website, of 
102 respondents looked at features of respondents’ website experience; their attitudes 
to current cohabitation law, against the background of their socio-demographic status 
and their financial practices as a couple. This was followed by semi-structured 
interviews where issues could be explored in more depth in a qualitative study 
comprising a purposive sample of 30 (18 men and 12 women) selected from the 
internet survey respondents and some of their partners.  
The Nuffield study, on the other hand, aimed first to capture a nationally 
representative picture of how, if at all, legal awareness and activity surrounding 
cohabitation more generally had changed, given the increased publicity and 
government-funded campaign on this issue. Public attitudes towards marriage, 
cohabitation and their legal and financial consequences were explored through a 
sample of 3,197 respondents in England and Wales as part of the British Social 
Attitudes (BSA) Survey 2006 to update the national picture gained from this survey in 
2000 (‘the nationally representative study’). The follow-up qualitative study 
comprising 48 in-depth interviews with current and former cohabitants selected from 
the national sample (‘the Nuffield qualitative study’) then went on to explore financial 
practices, including processes of decision-making, understandings of commitment, 
awareness of and attitudes to current cohabitation law and possible law reform.
19
 Both 
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projects were undertaken at a time when cohabitation law was under scrutiny by the 
Law Commission and when these issues were the subject of extensive media attention 
and public debate.
20
 
By the time these projects were undertaken, a good number of other demographic, 
economic and sociological studies of cohabitants had been and were being conducted 
in the light of clear social trends indicating family restructuring away from 
marriage.
21
 In particular, Smart and Stevens’ study of cohabitation breakdown22 was 
the first to stress the diversity of heterosexual cohabitation relationships and identified 
a spectrum of commitment within cohabitation ranging from the contingently 
committed couples at one end to the mutually committed at the other. Their study 
primarily focused on the most fragile contingently committed who are easily 
distinguished from stable and committed married couples and can be contrasted with 
Jane Lewis’s inter-generational study23 which focused on mainly mutually committed 
couples whose behaviour mirrored that most commonly identified with marriage. 
Arthur, Lewis and Maclean’s study Settling Up uncovered the gulf between 
settlements made between divorcing couples, as compared with those made on 
cohabitation separation and the indirect effects this has on the standard of living of 
children of those relationships.
24
 Aspects of this work were confirmed by later studies 
by Douglas et al
25
 and Tennant et al
26
 which focused on separating cohabitants. 
These, together with the Nuffield and MoJ studies which focused on intact cohabiting 
couples, fed into the Law Commission’s review of cohabitation law which resulted in 
its consultation paper in May 2006, and its subsequent report in July 2007, containing 
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law reform proposals.
27
 
[B] Legal rationality – conflicting messages? 
In our analysis of the data from our two studies, we set out to consider the practices of 
cohabitants alongside attitudes to their legal position. In particular, we were keen to 
consider how ‘legally rational’ people were, or felt able to be, inside an ongoing 
relationship. In the cohabitation context, law assumes people are making an active 
choice to cohabit rather than marry and that they will act in a legally rational way to 
order their legal affairs within the confines of property and succession law, should 
they wish to. This places the onus for action on the couple who must make wills if, for 
example, they wish their partner to succeed to their estate if they die and/or make 
declarations of trusts in respect of the family home to indicate precise ownership 
shares are agreed in the event that the relationship breaks down.  
For married or Civil Partner couples, on the other hand, the law takes the obverse 
approach. Legal rationality is certainly not required to make contingent arrangements, 
as assumptions are made in law that a spouse or civil partner should inherit at least 
part of the estate on death and that financial relief should be provided on divorce to 
the economically weaker spouse or civil partner. Could this be in part because it is 
recognised that these are difficult arrangements to make between intimate partners 
who are actively engaging in family life, often playing roles which will change over 
time? Indeed, even if they wish to, such couples cannot act in a tailor-made legally 
rational way by making an enforceable pre-marital agreement detailing how assets 
should be divided on divorce or dissolution. To do so has classically been thought to 
be contrary to public policy
28
 and, as a consequence, it is not possible to oust the 
jurisdiction of court on these matters in advance of a separation.
29
 Thus although it is 
accepted that marriage is an economic relationship, the nature of the bargain struck is 
for the state to decide at the point of marriage breakdown and not for the parties to 
agree in advance. Thus the courts are charged with redistributing assets according to 
statutory criteria which, as a matter of public policy, make the interests of any 
children of the family the first consideration.
 30
 The judicially interpreted overarching 
aim of divorce is now to achieve ‘fairness’ through an examination of these criteria. 
This has been construed as meaning that the needs of the parties and any children 
must be met first, followed by sharing (usually equally) the matrimonial assets where 
these exceed the needs and where there have not been any ‘stellar’ contributions 
which warrant unequal sharing. Then, if appropriate, compensation for relationship 
disadvantage can be awarded to the economically weaker spouse.
31
 Whilst we are 
experiencing some judicial activism which has allowed pre-marital agreements to be 
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considered as ‘one of the circumstances of the case’32 alongside other statutory 
criteria, they are not enforceable and, in contrast to the situation in many other 
jurisdictions, are culturally not part of our courtship rituals.  
This, in a sense, makes the law’s expectations of legal rationality by cohabitants, in 
default of which no safety net is provided to the economically weaker partner,
33
 
unrealistic and contrary to social and cultural expectations within our society. 
Certainly, as discussed below, we found evidence that such ‘legally rational’ 
behaviour was difficult to achieve partly because such behaviour feels 
counterintuitive and partly because couples found it hard to discuss what would be 
appropriate on death or relationship breakdown, making them unable to act or agree to 
act in a legally rational way.  
For those cohabiting couples believing in the common law marriage myth – some 
53% of the 2006 British Social Attitudes survey’s nationally representative sample,34 
the conflicting messages are at their most powerful. This then raises the question of 
whether legal rationality is a flawed concept in the sphere of intimate personal 
relationships. Some argue that it is,
35
others consider that legal change will have effect 
on behaviour in this field.
36
 In addressing this further, it is helpful to explore the 
psychological dimension revealed in our studies.  
[B] A psychological dimension to legally rational behaviour? 
In both studies, the interview transcripts were analysed using a grounded theory 
approach.
37
 Themes relating to the research questions were investigated, their 
occurrence and context noted, and emerging themes not originally anticipated were 
considered in a process of constant comparative analysis. The core themes (in terms 
of researchers' and participants' priorities) were identified and focussed on for this 
analysis. In considering the range of cohabitants in the studies, we could identify 
cohabitants along the Smart and Stevens’38 spectrum of mutually committed to 
contingently committed, but this was not sufficient to explain the range of behaviours 
and attitudes that the study revealed. Particularly in the MoJ study, where perhaps 
unsurprisingly for a group drawn from an advice website the majority of cohabitants 
were mutually committed, a more refined categorisation was needed. In the analysis 
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of the interviews, the links between finances, commitment and different “types” of 
cohabitation were considered alongside demographic differences in order to explore 
the legal needs of diverse groups of cohabitants. From this, four main categories of 
cohabitants emerged (with some overlap) which presented a psychological dimension 
to their behaviours, and we found these groupings also fitted the more diverse 
Nuffield follow-up study respondents drawn from the national sample. We therefore 
concluded from our further analysis that cohabitants in both qualitative projects fell 
into a typology comprising: 
• Ideologues 
• Romantics 
• Pragmatists 
• Uneven couples 
The ‘Ideologues’ are in long term, committed relationships, but one or both partners 
will have an ideological objection to marriage. The ‘Romantics’, in contrast, do 
expect to get married eventually, and see cohabitation as a step towards marriage. 
Interviewees in this group typically saw marriage as a very serious commitment, not 
to be undertaken in haste, and preferably an institution entered following a ‘proper’ 
wedding for which they were actively saving. They also scorned the idea of getting 
married for legal or financial protection. A third group, termed ‘Pragmatists’, took a 
functional view and so were making decisions about whether to marry or cohabit on 
legal or financial grounds. In all three of these groups, both partners were mutually 
committed to the relationship. The fourth group we found comprised people in 
‘Uneven Couples’ where one wants to marry, and one does not or where one is more 
committed to the relationship than the other, leaving one in a vulnerable position. 
Whilst these groups were not necessarily mutually exclusive, we did find that these 
standpoints both drove and explained behaviours.  
It is suggested that viewing cohabitants through this lens could be helpful in 
considering how the law could and should respond to the phenomenon of increasing 
numbers of cohabiting couples. Rather than defining unmarried cohabiting couples 
negatively by what they are not (ie not married), and viewing them as a social 
problem, compared with those who are married, perhaps our analysis can help explain 
what positive things cohabiting couples see their style of family structure as offering 
them.  
The relative size of these groups is important in legislative terms. In the MoJ study, of 
those who were aware of their legal rights having accessed the LTC website, 
Ideologues were the biggest group - comprising over a third of the participants. 
Uneven couples and Romantics were groups of equal sizes – each representing a 
quarter of the sample, with pragmatists being the smallest group. In the Nuffield 
qualitative study, on the other hand, Romantics, Uneven couples and Pragmatists were 
fairly equally represented, with ideologues being the smallest grouping – at around 
10% of the qualitative sample. 
Let us next consider which styles of couples can embrace a legally rational approach. 
[C]Ideologues and legal planning 
Both of our qualitative studies confirmed that Ideologues who were choosing not to 
marry for very clear reasons are capable of adopting a legally rational approach, other 
than in relation to marriage itself. Participants in this group had almost all made wills, 
made declarations of ownership in respect of the family home and drawn up next of 
kin documents in each other’s favour. The one legal step they were not generally 
prepared to take was that of getting married, however advantageous this might prove 
to be in terms of issues like pensions and inheritance tax. Many expressed their 
frustration that there was no mechanism other than marriage – often objected to for its 
patriarchal baggage – through which they could achieve parity with married couples. 
The symbolism and values associated with the language of marriage was a problem 
for some: 
‘The “marriage” word is what’s value-laden with all the concepts that we 
dislike. That’s what I object to. If they called it something like “civil 
contract and joint responsibilities”, then fine.’ (Peter, long term 
cohabitant, no children) 
Whereas the term ‘civil partnership’ was much more positively viewed, as Hannah 
summed up –  
‘I think just the language of civil partnership is quite interesting. The 
“civil” clearly is making a statement about it being, you know, not 
religious; being secular. And “partnership” is clearly about … For me it 
communicates something about equality, um in terms of two equal people 
making that … Progressing to that point where they want to register their 
partnership. Whereas marriage comes with so many other things in terms 
of society’s expectations or beliefs about it that, you know, it’s very 
difficult to separate out the legal stuff and the religious stuff from the kind 
of, um … The way our society operates around traditional male-female 
relationships.’ (Hannah, long term cohabitant) 
John and Linda were frustrated and affronted by their lack of legal rights and very 
worried about the fact that an inheritance tax bill would render their partner and their 
four children homeless, should either of them die. This was particularly so, given their 
commitment to each other, their children and their community –  
‘I feel I’m doing everything the government wants people to do. You 
know, we’re making a home, we’re bringing up children, we’re involved 
in the community … We are doing what the government wants people to 
do – you know, the more sort of family units in a way is what they want, 
and that’s why they want people to get married. If they want solid family 
units, they need to give people options of doing it that work within their 
lives. I think, for lots of different reasons, marriage clearly is not 
something that works that well in people’s lives any more.’ (Linda, long 
term cohabitant, 4 children) 
‘I can’t see that anyone – you know, the government or anybody – would 
want to put our children in a perilous state just because … You know, that 
can’t be the aim. I mean, their stated aim is they want to have a secure 
environment for children to grow up in, and that’s not what they’re doing. 
For people like me, who don’t want to get married, they’re not providing 
that and they ought to provide that.’ (John, partner of Linda, long term 
cohabitant, 4 children)  
Although they could have married, their ideological opposition to marriage was so 
strong and their conviction that their way of life was the best one for them and their 
children, that they were prepared to face financial disaster, rather than marry. They 
were not prepared to be pragmatic, but saw the issue of their legal vulnerability as one 
the state had quite negligently failed to address. 
Others were more troubled than angry, but shared the same sense of injustice that they 
were being financially punished for having chosen what they considered to be the best 
relationship for their situation –  
‘I think really it’s the pension and the inheritance tax that I’m 
uncomfortable with, because that feels unfair. That feels like I’m being 
punished in some way, for not being married.’ (Harriet, long term 
cohabitant) 
Thus a pro-marriage approach does not suit the ‘psychological partnership contract’ 
of couples in this group and they and their children remain legally vulnerable in terms 
of inheritance tax, succession rights and pensions, even if they take all the legal steps 
that are open to them. Yet the legal and psychological needs of this very committed 
and legally rational group would easily be met by the extension of a marriage-like 
civil partnership to different-sex couples along the lines of the Dutch model. The 
couples here were not looking for any lesser commitment than marriage – indeed a 
number considered themselves far more committed to each other than the average 
married couple – but the patriarchal and quasi-religious tenets embedded within even 
civil marriage was not something this group were prepared to sign up to, whatever the 
cost. To view this form of partnership as ‘marriage-lite’ would be to misunderstand 
the nature and motivations for this style of cohabitation relationship and exposes a 
weakness in family policy if it fails to provide legal safeguards for what seem to be 
the ‘strong and stable’ families it stated it wants to support. 
[C]Legal planning – Pragmatic couples 
Given that the Living Together Campaign is an appeal to the legally rational to either 
get married or take appropriate legal steps to achieve maximum legal protection 
before such disadvantage occurred, pragmatic couples must be its primary target. As 
we have seen, the Ideologues are willing to take all legal steps short of getting 
married. But it is with the Pragmatists, who like the Ideologues, were open to legally 
rational arguments, that the LTC could have best effect. If this can be done, at a 
moment before legal disadvantage occurs (rather than after as most often happens 
now), then Pragmatists, like Ideologues, will respond. 
Natasha, a Pragmatist, represented a clear success story for the LTC website –  
‘I was looking at alternatives to getting married. I was looking at the 
living together arrangements, which was mentioned on the BBC website. 
So I was having a look at that to see whether that compared favourably 
with marriage or not...It looked interesting but it wasn’t quite enough 
protection for both of us. For what we needed at that time. I’ve been in a 
relationship where I’ve cohabited before and at the end of that I was left 
with nothing and I wanted to have something which gave us equal rights 
and … You know, for example, if I took a career break to have children 
then, um, I’d quite like to have that represented in the amount I got back.’ 
(Natasha, about to cohabit, and engaged since accessing the website) 
Sarah, on the other hand, at 25 was a Romantic Pragmatist who planned eventually to 
marry, illustrated some of the psychological inhibitors to marrying for legally 
pragmatic reasons –  
‘Well I certainly wouldn’t even consider getting married … on the basis 
of financial strengths and weaknesses. I don’t know anybody that 
would.’(Sarah, first time cohabitant) 
Interestingly though, she had felt able to persuade her partner to transfer their home in 
joint names, from his sole name once she had discovered her legal situation.  
Joanne and her partner were also clear pragmatists who secured their pension rights 
just in time –  
‘And at work we were both … offered early retirement with a package 
that we couldn't really refuse. But … it meant that if we’d both retired 
early and we weren’t married, if either of us died afterwards we would 
lose out on the pension rights, so that’s what actually made us decide to 
get married.’ 
With this group, clearly the biggest issue is to work out how best get the information 
over to people and translate it into action before it is too late. Whilst we found that the 
Campaign over its first few years was being effective at the margins, with couples in 
our study resolving to take action rather than actually taking it in virtually all cases, 
we concluded that there was still a big information gap to address. What is more, 
information must be conveyed at a key moment in the relationship where there is an 
optimum chance of converting their legal awareness into legal action. Just how many 
of the 53% of cohabitants nationally,
39
 who still believe they are protected by the 
mythical shroud of common law marriage are in fact pragmatists we cannot say 
precisely from our qualitative studies. Our best estimate would be in the region of a 
quarter (and possibly fewer than this) as both members of the couple would need to be 
prepared to take the pragmatic action, on which they might not agree. Thus to 
maximise the Pragmatic couples, it is critical to dispel the common law marriage 
myth. However, this is no easy task, given how deeply rooted it still is. Whilst 
effective communication of the position as begun by the Living Together Campaign 
can be expanded, the timing of such interventions also seems to be crucial but again is 
not easy to achieve. 
[C]Legal Planning – Romantic couples 
Romantic couples are generally planning for marriage and this tends to divert them 
from legal action, even though the period of cohabitation can be greatly extended. 
Given 30% of children in England and Wales are now born to cohabitants,
40
 it is not 
just the adult partners themselves who are affected and left vulnerable. Some 
Romantic couples are or can change into pragmatists over time but as a group, they 
commonly exhibit an optimism bias which produces a reluctance to take legal action 
for what at the outset is only planned to be a short period of time. 
In terms of being willing to take legal steps to safeguard themselves if the relationship 
should break down or one of them die, most Romantics, unlike the Ideologues and 
Pragmatists, found it difficult to prepare for in advance for a worst case scenario, even 
though they knew it was a possibility. As Adam explained, ‘Until you’re actually in a 
situation, you don’t really start thinking … you know.’ (Adam, cohabitant, divorced 
with children). 
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There were also other psychological barriers to having to think in negative terms 
about a relationship which is happy and ongoing, as Barbara discovered when she and 
her partner attempted the process – 
‘It’s having to think about awkward things like who has the children when 
you split up. There’s no kind of benefits. It’s just all the negatives. It’s not 
like saying, “Wa-hey!” It’s more like going: “Yeah, so if you split up you 
have 50% of the money, and …”’ (Barbara, new cohabitant) 
In the same way that a study by Weinstein
41
 found that American college students 
expected a much rosier future for themselves than the average American, such as 
living longer, having longer-lasting marriages, more gifted children, fewer heart 
attacks, accidents and diseases than the average, most of our participants and in 
particular the Romantics, did not expect to die or separate or be unable to sort matters 
out amicably if their relationship broke down. Thus they saw no real need to go to the 
considerable trouble and possible expense of taking appropriate legal steps to 
safeguard the position of themselves, their partner and their children. 
As Shaun, in his 20s, explains it is quite counterintuitive to be thinking about making 
a will –  
‘It’s not something I’ve considered, because you don’t think you’re going 
to, you know, die the next day or something. Cos we’re too young to die 
sort of thing. But of course that’s not the case …’ 
Noreen, a long term 30 something cohabitant with 2 children was confident that a 
living together agreement was not needed –  
‘God forbid, if anything like that did happen I think we’re both mature 
enough to know that over the years we’ve both put enough in to just 
divide everything equally.’ 
Hannah encapsulates the dual aspect of the Romantic psychology which justifies her 
side-stepping the legally rational approach – 
‘I know when we looked at the cohabitation contract we’d probably been 
together about 10 years. We just looked at it and just thought, “This isn’t 
right for us, actually.” It’s going to cause more grief to actually specify it 
all out. Whereas actually if we split up tomorrow, we will find a way of 
splitting our assets. We know we will.’ (Hannah, long term cohabitant) 
In contrast to the optimism bias noticeable within the Romantic group, evidence of a 
pessimism bias often born out of experience towards marriage was, though, found in 
each of the other groups. This was sometimes ideological or for Pragmatist couples, 
often due to negative parental experiences, making marriage as an institution seem 
doomed to failure- 
Kyla, a cohabitant in her 20s with no children explains – 
‘I’m from a divorced family. He’s divorced and it does put a bit of a 
dampener on it you know.’ 
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Kim, in her 20s and cohabiting for seven years feels – 
‘[Marriage] is just about conforming really. A bit of paper, having the 
same surname and conforming.’ 
For Romantic couples and those who are negative about marrying, although 
committed to each other, a presumptive approach which provided a legal safety net 
for the vulnerable partner might be the most appropriate legal response, although a 
civil partnership model did also commend itself to some in these categories. Within 
the Romantic group in particular, couples do often have children whilst they are 
awaiting marriage and so are exposed to relationship-generated disadvantage, which 
will crystallise should the relationship break down before the wedding. Given that the 
average length of cohabitation for couples with children of the relationship has risen 
to over eight years,
42
 increasing numbers of couples are left only with the protection 
of legal arrangements they may or may not have made during the relationship to 
protect the vulnerable partner should things not work out as planned. Romantic 
couples are committed and value marriage so extraordinarily highly, that they agree 
that they should only get married when everything is exactly right. Yet the weaker 
economic partner and often any children living with them on separation pay a very 
high price should the relationship break down before the wedding bells have actually 
been rung, given the inferiority of the legal remedies available to them compared to 
those who did marry in greater haste. 
[C]Legal Planning – Uneven couples 
From the outset, Uneven couples do not share a common goal in the way that the 
Romantic, Ideologue or even Pragmatist couples do. This makes legal planning 
particularly problematic and often coincides with a severe power imbalance between 
partners. In terms of commitment to the relationship, it may well mean that one 
partner is totally committed, whereas the other is only committed as long as it suits 
them. Again, in terms of Smart and Stevens’ analysis,43 these couples do not fit 
comfortably at either end of the continuum, yet neither is their situation reflected by a 
middle position. Psychologically, the contract between the two partners is skewed in 
favour of the financially more powerful one and we also found that some couples 
were able to separate out different levels of commitment, indicating that they were 
emotionally committed but that did not mean they should be financially committed. 
This is the style of cohabitation relationship where vulnerability is most exposed and 
where if the role of family law is to protect the vulnerable, then the current law is 
clearly failing. 
One participant in the MoJ study talked about how his partner wanted to get married 
and he didn’t, as he wanted to retain control over his finances –  
‘Essentially it’s kind of a way of retaining a bit of balance in the 
relationship. You know, if she walks away she’s going to be poverty 
stricken. I’ll always look after the kids – obviously … But I wouldn't feel 
particularly inclined to do anything for her.’ (Simon, cohabitant with 2 
children) 
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This relationship would seem to be uneven in terms of the financial but not the 
emotional commitment. But does this make them a family in lesser need of legal 
protection, particularly as there are children of the relationship which will affect the 
carer’s financial autonomy, should the relationship break down? 
Given his emotional commitment, Simon’s partner, who was not one of our 
participants, is quite likely to be completely ignorant as to his financial motivations 
for not marrying or taking other legal action. Yet he holds all the financial cards and 
is the partner with the financial power which in the cohabitation context will mean 
that he will not suffer any relationship generated disadvantage, should they separate. 
As the current law stands, he has an absolute right to do that, despite the fact that his 
partner has given up a career to care for their children. Whilst Schedule 1 of the 
Children Act 1989 will provide some protection for her whilst the children are minors, 
she will not have any entitlement to a share of the family home in his sole name. If a 
couple do nothing at the outset of the relationship, perhaps because they see 
themselves as equal or perhaps because their lives start out as financially independent 
but that changes as their contributions to the relationship change, there is little that 
can be done if the other partner will not co-operate. Tricia captures how this makes 
clear where the power lies and risks affecting their psychological relationship -  
‘If anything happened now or Tom decided that he didn’t want to carry on 
the relationship, where does that leave me? Again, with absolutely 
nothing. And I have to write a list of everything that I contribute to the 
house, which is furniture and décor and things. Currently I’m trying to get 
him to sign it, but he’s looking at that as a threat, as if to say, “Well, why 
should I sign it?”’ (Tricia, divorced, now cohabiting with another 
divorcee) 
But even nearer the beginning of the relationship when couples throw their lot in 
together in terms of buying a home, issues such as wills which the LTC website 
strongly recommends can be difficult to raise or achieve for the more vulnerable 
partner – 
‘I mentioned once something about [making a will] and he said, “Oh, 
well. Do you want me to …?” And I thought, “Well, it’s a bit rude to say 
to someone, ‘Excuse me, can you just make another will and leave me 
everything?!’” I mean, it does sound like gold-digging then. But it’s from 
a practical point of view, you know.’ (Sheila, divorced with adult 
children, new cohabitant, whose partner was a lawyer) 
Gold-digging is not something cohabitants in our samples seemed to be aiming to 
achieve and in any event, as the law currently stands, any prospective gold-digger 
would be well-advised to seek a partner who will marry. However, within genuine 
relationships, the spectre of gold-digging may represent another psychological barrier 
to legal rationality, particularly in uneven relationships. In Sheila’s case, her lack of 
power in the face of her partner’s greater legal knowledge made her particularly 
vulnerable in a potentially uneven relationship in which she was wanting to make a 
significant emotional commitment and investment.  
Looking at the situation of Uneven couples led us to conclude that there is a strong 
case for including a presumptive scheme of legal protection for this vulnerable group, 
in the absence of mutual agreement by the couple to opt out, particularly where there 
are children of the relationship. Both the Law Commission’s proposals and the 
Cohabitation Bill 2009 adopted such an approach and seemed to endorse family law’s 
role in protecting vulnerability within intimate couple relationships beyond marriage.  
[C]Regulation, motivation and commitment – legal implications 
In addition to public attitudes which clearly support reform of cohabitation law, we 
would therefore argue that it is important to consider the ‘psychological contract’ 
which encompasses the style of motivation for and commitment within cohabitation 
relationships. Within our typology, we considered the variations in commitment as 
between groups. In law, marriage is considered the ultimate commitment because it is 
one that is declared publicly and so provable. This is the key distinction that is made 
between functionally similar married and cohabiting families which justifies a quite 
different treatment of the adjustment from intact to separated families. Yet it is the 
initial public commitment to the institution of marriage, rather than to the relationship 
that is rewarded within our redistribution of assets on divorce. This is regardless, in 
most cases, of any fault attributable to the parties’ conduct during the marriage which 
might have led to the breakdown. Commitment in the cohabitation context is always 
private and can range from the contingently committed to the mutually committed.
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However, our analysis shows that there was often a surprising ability to separate off 
the emotional or social commitment from a sense of legal and financial commitment 
which might be expected to accompany it, and this is almost encouraged by the 
operation of the current law, although few non-Ideological couples had made 
cohabitation agreements. Unless and until prenuptial agreements become enforceable, 
such a layered separation of commitment is difficult to achieve in the married context 
in this jurisdiction. However, increasing numbers of couples marrying are reportedly 
attempting to make prenuptial agreements, limiting financial commitment in the event 
of divorce, potentially throwing doubt on the superiority of commitment assumed to 
be found in marriage.
45
 In the absence of any fault-based redistribution of assets on 
divorce, it is questionable whether a commitment which by definition has been broken 
at the point of divorce, is a truer entitlement to asset distribution than need in 
functionally similar relationships.
46
  
Our studies also found some evidence of a gendered psychology with regard to the 
moment of commitment. Overall, family identity or belonging seemed more important 
for women. Some had changed their name to that of their partner to achieve this as 
had been found in other studies – and their moment of commitment was often 
different to men’s. Both men and women cited having a child as the moment of true 
commitment, but some gendered differences are still striking even in this context –  
‘Maria’s said to me before that moving in was a bigger deal for her than 
getting married. Whereas for me it’s kind of the other way round.’ (Tom, 
30, short term cohabitant now married) 
Financial commitment can be seen to be the most powerful to some men –  
‘Marriage is irrelevant and it’s obviously about the property. The buying 
the house … I see as more of a commitment than marriage.’ (Larry, 30’s, 
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Long term cohabitant with children)  
We would argue that public commitment is not an appropriate exclusive trigger for 
legal regulation of couple relationships in an era where those who marry are an 
increasingly select group. If fairness is the aim in the married context, why logically 
should this be rejected for functionally similar cohabiting families who are exposed to 
the same relationship-generated vulnerabilities on death and relationship breakdown? 
Furthermore, if there is a differential gendered component to the psychological 
moment of commitment, this needs to be factored in to what is being rewarded or 
punished within family regulation. 
[C]Gendered choices and rationality 
As well as a gendered view on commitment, there are often gendered choices taken 
within cohabiting relationships which will in turn produce a gendered outcome in 
terms of relationship generated disadvantage. Risman pointed to ‘the logic of 
gendered choices’47 whereby existing institutional and cultural arrangements make it 
practical for many couples who do not have a strong preference for following a 
traditional division of labour, to nonetheless adopt these traditional practices. Thus on 
the birth of a child, the father’s higher income, and/or the mother’s greater 
opportunity for paid leave, part-time work or family friendly employment may 
entrench them in a gendered breadwinner/homecarer relationship. This in the 
cohabitation context will always strongly favour the breadwinner, should the 
relationship breakdown. In legal terms, this exposes cohabitants, who have no right to 
a redistribution of assets on separation, to the economic disparity which these roles 
often promote. 
This then brings us back to whether the law should play the role of protecting the 
vulnerable or of striving to give couples more autonomy to arrange their own 
financial matters on relationship breakdown. The views of cohabitants themselves 
suggest that they were largely in favour of legal reform which gave cohabiting 
couples similar rights to married couples on breakdown, particularly where there were 
children of the relationship.  
We take the view that there is in cohabitation relationships a psychological contract 
between the partners which needs to be spelled out, rather than implicitly assumed by 
each partner, without necessarily any meeting of minds. This leads often to no 
recognition of the assumed quid pro quo which one partner may have relied on in 
choosing to play a role undertaken for the benefit of the family as a whole. Property 
law has struggled with the consequences, striving to find an invisible ‘common 
intention’ on which to found a constructive trust, and family law has provided no 
remedy to date in the cohabitation context. However, it is important to recognise that 
there is often a gendered dimension to the arrangements made through such ‘silent 
negotiations’ which is partly due to gendered structures within society and partly due 
to what might be termed ‘gender differentiated commitment’ as noted above. As Ruth, 
in her 30s and a cohabitant with three children, explained, there is a need to redress 
sacrifice through financial provision when relationships break down and this is 
commonly a gendered issue – 
‘Because in a partnership people make compromises and quite often it’s 
the woman that makes compromises and that’s part of the deal. If it then 
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turns sour … they shouldn’t be penalised because they’ve made 
sacrifices.’ 
Over the two qualitative studies, which included interviews with 78 current and 
former cohabitants, we observed few signs that an extension of legal rights would be 
viewed as oppressive, other than by some of the powerful partners (such as Simon 
above) in uneven relationships. These attitudes were also reflected in the general 
population captured in the BSA survey, who had an awareness of the need to avoid 
relationship generated disadvantage, regardless of whether the relationship was based 
on married or unmarried cohabitation. 
In this first phase of the Nuffield study, nationally representative public attitudes were 
tested by putting forward 10 scenarios which explored how meritorious a partner’s 
claim for financial provision was viewed where the law currently metes out different 
treatment to married and cohabiting couples on relationship breakdown or on death. 
We were looking to see how views changed according to variables such as – the 
presence or absence of children; whether the parties were married; the length of the 
relationship; financial and domestic contributions to the relationship and the 
circumstances leading to the claim for financial provision. 
The table below (Table 1) summarises the findings of what was viewed by the 
national sample as appropriate on relationship breakdown and resulted in a changed 
hierarchy of relationships deemed deserving of legal protection. 
Value: Page; Align: Left 
#TableBegin 
Table 1 
Beliefs regarding rights to financial provision on separation for married and 
unmarried couples 
% agree partner should have right to financial 
provision on separation if … 
If couple not 
married 
If couple 
married 
… couple living together for 20 years, three 
children, woman reduced work to part-time and 
then gave up work to look after family and 
home, man supported family financially and 
owns home, woman has no income and poor 
job prospects. 
89 – 
… couple for 10 years, no children, one partner 
worked unpaid to build up other partner’s 
business, partner who runs business also owns 
family home, other partner has no property or 
income of own. 
87 93 
… couple for 10 years, one partner has well-
paid job requiring frequent moves, other 
partner has worked where possible but has not 
had a settled career. 
69 81 
… couple for 2 years, one has a much higher 
income than the other and owns the family 
home. 
38 62 
… couple living together for 2 years with 
young child and now separating. She will be 
child’s main carer and he will pay child 
74 – 
support. 
Base 3,197 3,197 
#TableEnd 
This confirms a different hierarchy of relationship status to that currently embodied in 
law. Whilst unsurprisingly, people placed married couples with children at the head, 
cohabiting couples with children are deemed more worthy of financial provision on 
breakdown than married childless couples. Although there was lower support for short 
cohabiting childless couples to be able to apply for financial provision on breakdown, 
over 60% of the public represented in a nationally representative sample were in 
favour, higher than might have been expected following a 2 year relationship. 
[B] Implications for regulation? 
Let us then consider how best to regulate cohabitation, given this public hierarchy of 
support captured in Table 1 and what we have learned from about the psychological 
dimension set out in the suggested typology of cohabiting couples. [AQ –I hope this 
is now clearer]. The Living Together Campaign was an appeal to the legally rational 
to either get married or take appropriate legal steps to achieve maximum legal 
protection before disadvantage occurred. As we have seen, the Ideologues are willing 
to take legally rational steps short of getting married, yet are deeply unhappy with 
many aspects of current law. For them an extension of civil partnership to different-
sex couples would be a perfect solution. For the Pragmatists, who like the Ideologues, 
were open to legally rational arguments, the need is to ensure that they get the correct 
legal information so that they can make an informed choice about their relationship-
style and legal actions. Whilst the Living Together Campaign has made some inroads, 
there is still a critical job to be done in informing cohabiting couples of their 
vulnerable legal status at the right moment in time to trigger appropriate legal action 
in far more cases.  
Whilst aiming to allow couples the autonomy to make informed decisions about how 
to put their affairs in order is laudable and exactly what some couples want, this will 
not be a sufficient remedy for all, particularly where couples are uneven in the 
commitment and/or power they bring to their relationship. From their responses, it is 
clear that the participants within our typology have very different needs and issues 
about cohabitation. It was also evident that people can change their commitment or 
approach to the cohabiting relationship, or their views on marriage and commitment, 
over the course of a relationship, and particularly at times of life stage change. So 
Joseph, for example, who confirmed he was ‘ideologically opposed to marriage’, 
pragmatically married his cohabitant partner of 10 years following the birth of their 
daughter. Given the diversity both of cohabiting couples and of their legal needs , the 
law must adjust to changing social norms and ensure it is what Freeman terms 
‘socially located’.48 It must, in our view, adopt a pluralistic approach capable of 
balancing relationship autonomy with protection for the vulnerable. As has been seen, 
attempts to induce legal rationality may be part of the answer but are not the whole 
solution. Even for the legally rational, a wider range of options such as some form of 
Civil Partnership open to heterosexual couples as in the Netherlands, or a state-
endorsed contract affording fewer rights than those afforded married and same-sex 
civil partners along the lines of the French Pacte Civile de Solidarité would encourage 
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support for stable families and provide a stepping-stone for those Romantic 
cohabitants planning to marry. 
It is, though, uneven couples who are a large group of vulnerable cohabitants who 
pose real problems for this approach as joint and agreed action is not achievable. For 
them a presumptive approach, out of which other styles of cohabitants may agree to 
opt, is most clearly needed and should be pursued if family law is to fulfil its role of 
protecting vulnerable family members and not just those who are married. 
[B] Mapping legal solutions onto psychological typology – 
some conclusions 
Overall, the psychological examination of what is happening in these unmarried 
cohabiting relationships shows that reasons for cohabitation, as opposed to marriage, 
are diverse. Attempts to ensure a legally rational, pragmatic approach will be slow 
and haphazard and if they succeed, they will only reach just the tip of the iceberg. 
Even after the Living Together Campaign, only 12% of the nationally representative 
BSA survey of cohabitants had made wills; 19% had sought legal advice on 
cohabitation. Though effective, even a move to a compulsory declaration of beneficial 
interests in the home through changes to Land Registry procedures had only 
encompassed 15% of cohabitants in 2008, up from 8% in 2001. 
We have seen that hidden psychological inhibitors to legally rational behaviour are 
quite powerful and often gendered. Furthermore, cohabitants as well as the general 
public, were largely in favour of legal reform, particularly where there were children 
of the relationship. We also found that whilst the idea of an extension of civil 
partnerships to heterosexual couples was enthusiastically received by most 
cohabitants, so was the idea of a presumptive legal framework for cohabitants. 
Proposals for cohabitation law reform to date have sought to view and define 
cohabitation negatively in terms of the fact that it is different and thus inferior to the 
gold standard that is marriage. Yet, given what we know about the psychological 
motivations of different styles of cohabitants, should we not now at least consider 
valuing cohabitation, rather than condemning it, for being the second most stable form 
of family relationship?
49
 
As shown in Table 1 above, the concept of relationship-generated disadvantage was a 
reason to provide financial provision. But our nationally representative study found 
that there was far less support for the law to distinguish between financial remedies 
for separating married and cohabiting couples where the relationship was long term, 
where there are children of the relationship or where there is evidence of ‘joint 
enterprise’ contributions, for example, to a partner’s business by the other partner. 
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Having said that, views on these issues do change across the generations and it is 
difficult to know for certain if this is a periodic or generational effect. We did find 
that younger people without children tend to more readily endorse financial 
autonomy. Overall, however, most people were very child-centred in their thinking, 
which reflects the current law of financial provision on divorce and civil partnership 
dissolution. We also found that those who were older or who had more than one child 
tended to favour more equal recognition of financial and non-financial contributions. 
In the qualitative studies, there was also a correlation between the ‘type’ of cohabiting 
relationship people were in, and their money-management system within the 
relationship, but this correlation is not a straightforward one. Most ‘Romantics’ and 
the ‘Pragmatists’ had a system of joint accounts, usually with some single-owned 
accounts too (‘partial pooling’), while all of the ‘Uneven Couples’ had separate 
accounts, even though three of these couples had been together for many years. The 
‘Ideologues’ were broadly divided into two groups. Half had joint accounts, but half 
retained separate finances even after many years together, and even after children, 
which they saw as reflecting their ideological position. Many respondents made 
explicit distinctions between a romantic or emotional commitment to their partner, 
and financial commitment to a relationship in terms of joint accounts and shared 
savings plans. This, too, is partly a generational effect; younger married couples are 
also more likely to have separate finances and so caution is needed in drawing 
conclusions about these practices as a commitment-indicator for a relationship.
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Given that we have had two different models for reform recently put forward by the 
Law Commission and then Lord Lester’s Cohabitation Bill, it is interesting to see 
which of these presumptive models might be best suited to different cohabitant types. 
The Law Commission’s 2007 proposals are based on redressing economic advantage 
and disadvantage at the end of the cohabitation relationship, rejecting the idea that 
cohabitation law should be put on a par with marriage but permitting cohabitants to 
make contracts in which they opt out of the proposed scheme. It is suggested that this 
is a model particularly suited to two free-thinking autonomous adults who ‘choose’ 
their arrangement, such as the Ideologues. The proposals reflect shared risk of 
economic disadvantage to the point that one half of disadvantage is payable at the end 
of the relationship (providing the activity which resulted in disadvantage, such as 
giving up work for childcare, was jointly agreed), with any economic advantage 
gained being repaid in full. The Ideologues in our study were (or saw themselves as) 
autonomous, had actively taken legal steps, were very aware of their situation and 
were often equally matched in financial terms. They were happy to negotiate 
financially with each other and to separate their layers of commitment. For them, the 
Law Commission’s proposals would be ideal as it reflected the ability to make their 
own arrangements, a view endorsed by Octavia, a long-term cohabitant who felt, 
‘You have to assume that people can make their own decisions’. 
Lord Lester’s Cohabitation Bill, in contrast, was needs-based, arguably simpler than 
the Law Commission’s scheme and saw issues of economic advantage or 
disadvantage as just two factors to be taken into account alongside the welfare of any 
child and a non-exhaustive list of other factors (clause 9). It was much more aligned 
to the approach in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, although would have limited its 
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remit to providing for needs, rather than equal sharing of assets. This certainly fits 
with a wider range of our identified cohabitant types and in particular, better serves 
the needs of Uneven couples (who may not have made joint decisions which led to 
economic disadvantage). However, it was a welfarist rather than entitlement model 
that acknowledged the reality of dependency so often triggered by gendered choices 
on childcare and sacrifice found within heterosexual couple relationships. 
In conclusion, we take the view that the psychological dimension of different styles of 
cohabiting relationship revealed in our studies underline that any legal reform should 
provide a range of legal options for cohabitants. These should include both (and 
primarily) a presumptive scheme giving cohabitants (and particularly cohabitants with 
children of the relationship) automatic rights and obligations akin to marriage from 
which couples can opt out, alongside an opt-in scheme giving flexibility as to the 
terms. In this way, ‘Uneven couples’ would gain protection otherwise impossible to 
achieve. In addition ‘Romantic’ couples planning to marry, and ‘Ideologue’ couples 
whose principles will not allow them to marry can negotiate their own arrangements, 
yet gain a recognised legal status other than marriage which publicly acknowledges 
their commitment to each other. ‘Pragmatists’ would also gain a wider spectrum of 
choice. 
The analysis of the psychological dimension within relationships reinforces the view 
that any legal regulation of cohabitants must cater for the different motivations for 
cohabitation and acknowledge it carries for some a positive social value as a form of 
two-parent family. Failing to do so would accentuate the existing ‘legal rationality 
mistake’ identified by Barlow and Duncan51 and ignore the reality of gendered moral 
decision-making
52
 revealed by these studies within such relationships. The Law 
Commission’s proposals were a bold and radical attempt to strike the balance between 
autonomy and protection and would certainly have improved the current law. But by 
ignoring need and only redressing one half of economic disadvantage where this 
could be proven, the balance was skewed too much towards autonomy and risked 
leaving vulnerable partners exposed. Unlike the Law Commission’s scheme, which 
would have retained the tribal distinction between the married and unmarried, the 
Cohabitation Bill would have plugged a gap, providing a way to regularise 
cohabitation contracts and provoking debate on how to reform financial provision 
across all couple relationships in the future. 
We would like to return in the last instance to Fineman’s proffered concept of 
vulnerability, as a suggested counterpoint to the calls for autonomy-driven family law. 
We argue that this is particularly pertinent in the context of the legal and policy 
response to the changing nature of marriage and cohabitation. Feminist writers such 
as Deech,
53
 see family policy based on autonomy as the driver for legal development 
towards equality for women within relationships, and away from the evils of 
dependency. By contrast, Fineman argues for a state response to vulnerability which 
will counter privilege and lead to a substantive equality which recognises, rather than 
ignores, the structural and often gendered inequalities inherent in institutions, 
including that of marriage and by analogy cohabitation too. Drawing on the US 
context, she explains: 
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‘To richly theorize a concept of vulnerability is to develop a more 
complex subject around which to build social policy and law; this new 
complex subject can be used to redefine and expand current ideas about 
state responsibility towards individuals and institutions. In fact, I argue 
that the “vulnerable subject” must replace the autonomous and 
independent subject asserted in the liberal tradition. Far more 
representative of actual lived experience and the human condition, the 
vulnerable subject should be at the center of our political and theoretical 
endeavours. The vision of the state that would emerge in such an 
engagement would be both more responsive to and responsible for the 
vulnerable subject, a reimagining that is essential if we are to attain a 
more equal society than currently exists …’54 
Within marriage, our potentially ‘responsive state’ in England and Wales has 
recognised the vulnerability inherent within the gendered dynamics of intimate couple 
relationships, and law and policy have addressed this. We are apparently keen to 
stamp out the gender discrimination inherent in attributing relative values to the 
qualitatively different contributions to marriage made respectively by breadwinner 
and homemaker. In the twenty-first century these are to be valued equally when 
deciding how assets should be redistributed on divorce, as was made very clear by 
Lord Nicholls in White v White:
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‘If, in their different spheres, each contributed equally to the family then 
in principle it matters not which of them earned the money and built up 
the assets. There should be no bias in favour of the money earner and 
against the homemaker and the child-carer.’ 
Despite evidence, to which the current studies have added, of equivalent vulnerability 
within the majority of functionally similar cohabitation relationships, the state has to 
date chosen not to address these very same inequalities. It is not currently, it seems, in 
responsive mode. We have seen that there have been moves by the courts towards 
giving greater liberal autonomy to married couples to agree divorce outcomes in 
advance through prenuptial agreements, a matter on which the Law Commission has 
also been asked to report. Others, however, have warned of the dangers of being lured 
by the superficial attractions of constructions of autonomy which may not take full 
account of the risks which the vulnerable subject is unable to avoid. 
Herring, in particular, has argued that individual conceptions of autonomy have no 
place within family law as they are ‘inconsistent with the realities of family life; are 
dissonant with the how people understand their intimate lives; and work against the 
interests of women’.56 Rather, he suggests, we need a vision of autonomy which 
recognises the interdependency and vulnerability of both children and adults within 
family relationships. Whilst enforceable prenuptial agreements and cohabitation 
contracts in short relationships without children enhance autonomy in a positive way, 
respecting a couple’s right to private and family life enshrined in Article 8 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950 (the European Convention), they can have negative consequences which do not 
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sit well with other family values. In particular, the fluid nature of family life poses 
problems for advocates of enforceable prenuptial agreements (and indeed cohabitation 
contracts) as they are likely to need frequent updating to reflect changed 
circumstances (eg following the birth of a child). Couples busy with the day to day 
challenges of family life may not get around to taking legal advice and formally 
review them, as has been shown to be the case for cohabitants. US psychological 
literature also indicates that prenuptial agreements are difficult to negotiate and may 
exacerbate existing power dynamics within relationships.
57
 Whilst autonomy would 
be gained, the protection currently afforded the weaker economic spouse at the point 
of divorce would be lost. The state would in essence be making an already vulnerable 
subject potentially more vulnerable by allowing contracting out of financial 
obligations, regardless of their partner’s needs or relationship-generated disadvantage 
suffered in the married as well as the cohabitation context. This is the very situation 
which under the current law the judicially developed ‘fairness’ principle seeks to 
prevent and which we suggest the new government, in the light of our discussion and 
mounting research evidence, should extend to apply to functionally similar families to 
which it has declared its support. To do so, would be to acknowledge the reality that 
the state, as well as children growing up in families, have significant interests in the 
relationship dynamics and agreements made between adult partners who are parents. 
It would also give us positive proof that we had managed to elect a truly responsive 
state in the field of family law and that we had finally reached the end of a very rocky 
road to reform. 
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